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Corporations and constitutional guarantees 
Elizabeth FOSTER* 
La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés offre une certaine 
protection constitutionnelle aux corporations aux titres des libertés 
fondamentales et des garanties juridiques. L'ambiguïté du libellé des 
dispositions relatives à la liberté de circulation et d'établissement et aux 
droits à l'égalité rendent incertaines leur application aux corporations. 
Le raisonnement de l'arrêt Big M pourrait indirectement assurer une 
protection constitutionnelle aux corporations. Si la définition de la portée 
de la Charte constitutionnelle, et partant, la détermination de son impact 
sur les plan social et politique doit demeurer essentiellement l'œuvre du 
judiciaire, une autre solution, celle-là liée à un processus général de 
révision constitutionnelle, pourrait marquer la définition des objets de la 
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec. 
Certain constitutional guarantees are now clearly available to 
corporations, under the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, in the areas of Fundamental Freedoms and Legal Rights. 
Ambiguous terminology in the provisions dealing with Mobility and 
Equality Rights leaves the status of corporate applicants uncertain. The 
rationale of Big M may guarantee constitutional protection to corpora-
tions as indirect beneficiaries of rights to which they have no direct 
access. Whereas in the case of the Canadian Charter, responsability for 
the clarification of the scope and thereby of the political and social 
impact of the guarantees is likely to remain with the courts, an alternative 
solution may be available in Quebec. Clarification andlor reconsideration 
of the objectives of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
as they are defined through the identification of its beneficiaries, could 
take place in the context of general constitutional review. 
* Avocate, Law Society of Upper Canada. 
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Conclusion 1151 
Whatever may have been the original purpose of a Charter of Rights 
it is clear, in the case of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
that the constitutional guarantees contained therein can no longer be 
characterized as providing a shield to protect the rights of the individual 
citizen — with exceptional protection afforded by certain provisions 
dealing with rights to which he becomes entitled as a member of a 
particular group. It is clear from the case law that corporations share with 
citizens the benefits of many of these constitutional guarantees. 
The first and major part of this paper consists of an overview of the 
case law to date and a summary of the types of guarantees afforded by the 
courts to corporate applicants under the Canadian Charter. 
Discussion focusses on those sections of the Charter which have 
been interpreted in such a manner as to offer protection to corporations, 
and on those provisions in which the use of ambiguous terminology raises 
1. Part 1 of Schedule B to the Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11(U.K.), in R.S.C. 1985, 
App. II, No. 44. 
2. Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12. 
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doubts as to the scope of the guarantees and the nature of the 
beneficiaries. Some apparent inconsistencies in Charter interpretation are 
considered and the possibility of an extension of the range of Charter 
guarantees available to corporations is discussed in the context of the 
various sections. 
No reference is made to those rights and freedoms which are clearly 
not applicable or concerning which no serious question has been raised as 
to their availability to corporate beneficiaries. 
In a second and minor part of the paper the author notes that the 
present state of Canadian Charter jurisprudence can satisfy neither those 
who view a Charter of Rights as a shield primarily designed to protect the 
rights and freedoms of human beings, nor on the other hand the advocates 
of adequate constitutional guarantees for corporate interests. In the 
absence of political direction, ambiguous terminology concerning Charter 
beneficiaries has placed an unjustifiable burden upon judges, who are 
understandably reluctant to shoulder the full responsability for societal 
choices with far-reaching political and economic consequences. 
The point is made that, whereas in the case of the Canadian Charter 
responsability for the clarification of the scope and thereby of the political 
and social impact of the guarantees must continue to be the unhappy lot of 
superior court judges, an alternative solution may be available in Quebec. 
The evolutionary drift of Canadian Charter interpretation, as it identifies 
the beneficiaries and thereby defines the social impact of constitutional 
rights, could provide valuable lessons in an eventual review of the 
constitutional status and objectives of another Charter of Rights — one to 
which the case law discussed below may or may not be considered totally 
relevant. 
In the context of eventual constitutional review, the case is made for 
a clarification and/or reconsideration of the objectives of the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms as they are defined through the 
identification of the beneficiaries of its guarantees. 
1. Corporations and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Constitutional protection is now available to corporations with 
regard to a number of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 24(1) sets out a 
remedy for "individuals", whether real persons or artificial ones such as 
corporations, whose rights under the Charter have been infringed3. 
3. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, p. 313. 
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In general, Charter interpretation has resulted in the inclusion of 
corporations under the terms "everyone", "anyone" and "any person", 
except where the right by its nature is considered not to be applicable to 
corporate beneficiaries4. 
Constitutional guarantees are clearly available in the areas of 
Fundamental Freedoms and Legal Rights. The exclusion of corporations 
from the benefits offered under the Equality Rights and Mobility Rights 
provisions of the Charter is examined and the possibility of the extension 
of certain guarantees to cover corporations is considered in the context of 
the various sections. 
1.1. Fundamental freedoms 
1.1.1. Section 2(a) — Freedom of religion 
In the case of R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.5 the question of whether a 
corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion was found to be 
irrelevant by the Supreme Court of Canada. A law which itself infringes 
religious freedom is, for that reason alone, inconsistent with s. 2(a) of the 
Charter and it matters not whether the accused is a Christian, Jew, 
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, atheist, agnostic or whether an individual or a 
corporation. It is the nature of the law, not the status of the accused that is 
in issue6. Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a 
criminal charge by arguing the constitutional invalidity of the law under 
which the charge is brought7. 
1.1.2. Section 2(b) — Freedom of expression 
Corporations may enjoy the freedom of expression guaranteed by 
section 2(b) of the Charter. After a prolonged debate which saw the 
appeal courts divided on the issue, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the 
case of Ford v. Quebec (A.G.f, decided in favour of the inclusion of 
commercial expression within the ambit of the protection afforded by this 
provision. Freedom of commercial expression while avalaible to both the 
individual and the corporate beneficiary is, of course, of primary interest 
to the latter. 
4. See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d. ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1985, 
p. 667. 
5. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 3. 
6. Id., p. 314. 
7. Id., p. 316. 
8. Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. 
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According to the reasoning of the Supreme Court, to know what is 
protected by the freedom of expression, one should ask whether there is a 
reason why the guarantee should not extend to a particular kind of 
expression, rather than ask whether the guarantee should be construed as 
extending to particular categories of expression9. Commercial expression 
which protects listeners as well as speakers, plays a significant role in the 
development of the individual and of personal autonomy. In accordance 
with the principle that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter 
should be given a large and liberal interpretation, there was, in the opinion 
ot the Supreme Court, no sound basis on which commercial expression 
could be excluded from the protection of s. 2(b) of the Charter10. It was, 
however, noted with regard to other juridictions that commercial 
expression does not always enjoy the same degree of protection as other 
forms of constitutionally protected expression. 
Similarly, in the case of Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.)U the 
Supreme Court favoured a broad interpretation of the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by s. 2(b), so as to protect the right to undertake 
commercial advertising. In this case, however, statutory limitations were 
justified according to the criteria established by section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter and by section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter. 
The inclusion of corporate activities within the ambit of the 
protection offered by section 2(b) has given rise to interpretations of the 
meaning of freedom of expression which sometimes display a suprising 
degree of broadness and liberality. For example, in the case of Institute of 
Edible Oil Foods et al v. R.12, the court was of the view that the colour in 
which margarine is presented to the public constitutes a form of 
expression protected by s. 2(b). However, provincial legislation aimed at 
controlling the colour of this product was found to meet the criteria of 
section 1 of the Charter. 
That the freedom of the press and other media of communication 
specifically included in the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) is 
not restricted in its application to individual members of the media is clear 
from the case law. This guarantee has been successfully invoked by 
business entities including corporations13. 
9. Id., p. 756. 
10. Id., p. 766-767. 
11. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
12. Institute of Edible Oil Foods et al. v. R., (1987) 47 D.L.R. (4th) 368 (Ont. H.C.); conf. 
Dec. 1989 (CA.); leave to appeal refused, S.C.C. Sept. 1990. 
13. See for example : Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 ; Toronto 
Sun Publishing Corp. v. A.G. Alberta, (1985) 6 W.W.R. 36 (Alta CA.). 
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1.1.3. Section 2(d)—Freedom of association 
It has been argued14 that the guarantee of freedom of association 
could be relevant in an economic context. It could include, for instance, 
the freedom to join trade associations or other business groupings, or the 
freedom "not" to join groupings of this kind that are made mandatory by 
legislation. (For example, compulsory industry-wide labour negotiations, 
or compulsory producer participation in marketing boards or similar 
schemes.) However, the possibility that s. 2(d) might guarantee the 
freedom "not" to associate, in whatever context, appears to have been 
ruled out, at least for the time being15. 
The fundamental question of whether the guarantee of s. 2(d) is 
available to corporations whose interests are economic in nature has so 
far received no direct response. However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act16 noted that the Charter, 
with the possible exception of s. 6, does not concern itself with economic 
rights, while Chief Justice Dickson described the purpose of the s. 2(d) 
guarantee as protecting individuals from the vulnerability resulting from 
isolation and assuring effective participation in society17. On the other 
hand, an "individual's" right to form an association in order to earn a 
living did receive constitutional protection under s. 2(d) in Black v. Law 
Society of Alberta™. 
Thus it appears that s. 2(d) may, in certain circumstances, protect 
rights which have a very significant, if not predominant, economic aspect 
but that such guarantees are only available to individuals. The inter-
pretative problem presented by such a reading of s. 2(d) is that, in order to 
restrict this guarantee to individuals, the term "everyone" used in s. 2 
must be interpteted differently for the various paragraphs of the section19. 
14. W.D. Moull, "Business Law Implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms", (1984) 8 C.B.L.J. 449, p. 471. 
15. MacPhee v. Nova Scotia (Pulpwood Marketing Board), (1989) 56 D.L.R. (4th) 582 
(N.S.C.A), leave lo appeal refused : [1989] 2 S.CR. viii; Lavigne v. OPSEU (1989) 56 
D.L.R. (4th) 474 (Ont. CA.), leave to appeal granted: [1989] 1 S.C.R.X. 
16. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, p. 412 (Mclntyre, J.). 
17. Id., p. 334 (Dickson, C.J.). 
18. Black v. Law Society of Alberta, (1986) 27 D.L.R. (4th) 527 (Alta. CA.); appeal 
dismissed for other reasons : [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591. 
19. See infra, discussion re notes 39, 40. 
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1.2. Legal rights 
1.2.1. Section 7 — Life, liberty and security of the person 
A corporation may not invoke section 7. In the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, "everyone" must be read in light of the rest of the 
section and defined to exclude corporations and other artificial entities 
incapable of enjoying life, liberty or security of the person20. 
This denial to corporations of the protection afforded by s. 7 is hard 
to reconcile with the observations of the Supreme Court in Re B.C. Motor 
Vehicle Act21, concerning the relationship between s. 7 and ss. 8 
to 14. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamer (as he then was) who delivered 
the majority judgment in this case, ss. 8 to 14 illustrate some of the 
parameters of the right to life, liberty and security of the person. They 
address specific deprivations of these rights in breach of the principles of 
fundamental justice, and as such are concerned with violations of s. 7. 
Among these illustrations of specific infringements of s. 7 there are cases 
where the beneficiaries of the guarantees are corporations (see below), as 
for example in the case of s. 822. From this, it would seem to follow that 
the protection afforded by section 7 is not necessarily limited to natural 
persons. 
In order to reconcile these seemingly contradictory conclusions 
concerning the beneficiaries of s. 7 and of ss. 8-14, one would have to 
assume that, whereas one of the purposes served by ss. 8 to 14 is to 
provide examples of instances in which a s. 7 right would be infringed, 
this is not the only purpose. In other words, where the victim is a natural 
person, an infringement of one of these guarantees could imply a breach 
of s. 7, but in a case where the beneficiary of one of the rights guaranteed 
by ss. 8 to 14 is not a natural person, for example a corporation, this 
intimate connection between s. 7 and the sections which follow does not 
exist. This argument, which would serve to remove any ambiguity with 
regard to the exclusion of corporations from the protection of s. 723, is not 
however supported by the subsequent observation of Lamer J. in Re B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act. In the context of the discussion of the relationship 
between s. 7 and ss. 8 to 14 he notes that ss. 7 to 14 could have been fused 
into one section, with inserted between the words of s. 7 and the rest of 
20. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.), supra, note 11, p. 1004 ; Zutphen Bros. Construction Ltd. 
v. Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 705, p. 709. 
21. Re B.C. Motor Véhicule Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, p. 502. 
22. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
23. Now decreed by the Supreme Court in Irwin Toy, supra note 11. 
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those sections the provision "and, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing (s. 7) the following shall be deemed to be in violation of a 
person's rights under this section"24. Such phrasing, within the ambit of 
s. 7 itself, would have excluded the possibility of any additional purpose 
for the guarantees now provided by s. 8 to 14 — a purpose such as the 
protection of non-human beneficiaries, including corporations. 
The conclusion of the Supreme Court in Irwin Toy and in Zutphen 
Bros, would seem to remove any lingering doubts concerning the nature 
of s. 7 beneficiaries and to suggest that the Chief Justice's fusion 
hypothesis must be set aside in the interest of a clear understanding of the 
relationship between s. 7 and ss. 8 to 14. However, in both Irwin Toy and 
Zutphen Bros., the Supreme Court does in fact allow for an exception to 
the general principle that a corporation, which cannot be deprived of life, 
liberty and security of the person, cannot avail itself of the protection 
offered by s. 7. In noting in each case25 that the principle articulated in 
Big M is not applicable since there are no penal proceedings pending, the 
Supreme Court appears to be allowing for the possibility that, under 
certain circumstances, a corporation might benefit, indirectly, from the 
guarantees afforded to individuals under s. 7. Such circumstances might 
arise, for example, in the case of a corporation charged with an absolute 
liability offence, if it could be shown that an individual, who "could" be 
deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, might be charged 
under the same legislative provision26. 
Thus the implications of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Irwin 
Toy and Zutphen Bros., combined with the logical difficulties arising from 
the various observations of the Court on the matter of the relationship 
between s. 7 and ss. 8 to 14 would seem to suggest a less than absolute bar 
on corporations, at least as "indirect" beneficiaries of the guarantees 
provided by s. 7. 
It would seem necessary to admit of the possibility that a corporation 
might in certain circumstances rely upon s. 7, in order to avoid an 
anomaly which might otherwise result from the contrasting effects of ss. 7 
and 11(d). Section 11(d) which guarantees the presumption of innocence 
and therefore affords protection against reverse onus clauses, is available 
to corporate defendants, according to the limited authority to date27. If it 
is the case that the s. 7 guarantee is not available to corporations, whereas 
24. Re B.C. Motor Véhicule Act., supra, note 21, p. 502. 
25. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), supra, note 11, p. 1004 ; Zutphen Bros. Construction 
Ltd v. Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd., supra, note 20. p. 709. 
26. See discussion below, re s. 15. 
27. See infra, note 33. 
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s. 11(d) which is more limited in scope does afford protection to corporate 
beneficiaries, we could be faced with an anomalous situation with regard 
to absolute liability offences and reverse onus clauses. Thus, in the case 
of a corporation, a legislative provision which afforded an opportunity for 
defence would be more likely, through the operation of s. 11(d), to be 
considered violative of corporate constitutional rights than would an 
absolute liability provision which admitted of no defence. 
1.2.2. Section 8—Search of seizure 
Although the purpose of the section 8 guarantee is to "protect 
individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy" (my 
emphasis)28, protection against unreasonable search was afforded to a 
corporation by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Southam Inc.29 According 
to the trial judge in this matter, the scope of s. 8 "should include all 
human beings and all entities that are capable of enjoying the benefit of 
security against unreasonable search"30. 
1.2.3. Section 11 — Proceedings in criminal and penal matters 
According to the limited case law in the lower courts, "any person" 
within the meaning of s. 11 applies in principle to corporations31. 
However, not all the rights guaranteed under section 11 have been 
found applicable to corporate beneficiaries. 
Under s. 11(b), a corporation charged with an offence has the right to 
be tried within a reasonable time32. 
Section 11(d) which guarantees to any person charged with an 
offence the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty affords 
protection to corpoprate beneficiaries against "reverse onus" clauses 
frequently found in business-related statutes33. 
28. Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 22, p. 160. 
29. Id. 
30. Southam Inc. v. Hunter, (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 133 at p. 141, (Alta Q.B.) per 
Cavanagh J. ; appeal allowed on other grounds, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 420 (Alta. C A . ) ; 
conf., supra note 22. 
31. See e.g. R. v. Unity Auto Body Ltd., (1988) 68 Sask. R. 3 (Q.B.) ; Re Panarctic Oils 
Ltd. and The Queen, (1983) 141 D.L.R. (3d) 138 (N.W.T.S.C). 
32. See e.g. R. v. Grandma Lee's Inc., (1987) 24 C.R.R. 153 (D.C. Ont.) ; R. c. Habitations 
Périgord, (1989) R.J.Q. 439 (C.Q.) ; Re Panarctic Oils Ltd. and The Queen, supra, 
note 31. 
33. R. v. Ireco Canada II Inc., (1989) 43 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (C.A. Ont.) ; R. v. Wholesale 
Travel Group, L.W. 22.12.89 (C.A. Ont.) ; Ascenseurs Ledere c. Commission de la 
santé et de la sécurité du travail, (1988) R.J.Q. 1858 (CS.) 
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Certains paragraphs of s. 11 have been found not to apply to 
corporations. Since a corporation cannot be said to be a witness within 
the meaning of s. 11(c), it is not entitled to invoke this guarantee when an 
officer of the corporation is compelled to testify against it34. According to 
the Supreme Court, it would strain the interpretation of s. 11(c) if an 
artificial entity were held to be a witness35. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in P.P.G. Industries Canada 
and Attorney General of Canada36, found that s. 11(e) which guarantees 
that a person charged with an offence shall not be denied reasonable bail 
without just cause, does not apply to corporations. Likewise, the court 
found that s. 11(f) did not apply to a corporation. The majority of the court 
held that in the context of this paragraph the word "person" was not 
intended to include a corporation, but only natural persons who could in 
fact suffer the punishment of imprisonment for five years or more. 
The general consensus, as evidenced by the available case law, is 
therefore to the effect that although certain paragraphs of s. 11 are not 
applicable, this provision may in principle apply to corporations. On the 
other hand, the distinction drawn by Nemetz, C.J.B.C. between the 
expression "everyone" as used in other sections and "any person" as 
employed in s. 11 would seem to lead to the opposite conclusion that s. 11 
as a whole does not apply to corporations37. The Supreme Court, in 
holding that s. 11(c) did not apply to corporations, found that it was 
neither necessary nor desirable in the case under consideration38 to decide 
that under no circumstances may a corporation avail itself of the 
provisions of s. 11. Thus the question remains open. 
Mr. Justice La Forest, on behalf of the majority of the Court in 
Canada v. Schmidt39 and in R. v. Lyons40 opined that the expression "any 
person charged with an offence" in the opening words of s. 11 must have 
a constant meaning that harmonizes with the various paragraphs of the 
section. If in all cases a person charged with an offence must be capable of 
enjoying all the rights enumerated in s. 11 then a corporation, in so far as 
it clearly may not benefit from certain of the provisions contained therein, 
is not covered by the expression "any person charged with an offence" 
34. R. v. Amway Corp. Inc., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21, p. 37. 
35. Id., p. 39. 
36. P.P.G. Industries Canada and Attorney General of Canada, (1983) 146 D.L.R. (3d) 
261, leave to appeal granted, [1983] 1 S.C.R. XI. 
37. Id., p. 267-68. 
38. R. v. Amway Corp. Inc., supra, note 34. 
39. Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, p. 519. 
40. R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, p. 353. 
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and must therefore be excluded from the protection afforded by the 
section as a whole. It is to be noted that Mr. Justice Lamer (as he then 
was) dissenting in part in R. v. Lyons41, did not favour this "all-or-
nothing" approach which would restrict the application of s. 11 to 
circumstances in which all of the rights set out therein were applicable. 
Seaton J.A. in Re PPG Industries Canada Ltd.42, addressing this 
issue in his dissenting opinion, attempted to reconcile the need, as he saw 
it, for a uniform interpretation of the expression "any person" with the 
fact that certain rights are obviously not applicable to corporations. In his 
view, it was simply a case of a corporation not "requiring" rights such as 
those guaranteed by paragraphs (c) and (e). The fact that a provision 
might not be useful to a particular accused or a particular type of accused 
does not indicate that the words "any person" do not describe him. 
The question of the necessity of ascribing a constant meaning to the 
expression "any person" in s. 11 might perhaps be considered in light of 
the interpretation of s. 2 and the meaning ascribed to "everyone" in that 
provision. Freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of thought and 
freedom of religion are clearly not relevant concepts when dealing with 
corporate activities. (The fact that a corporation may be said to "benefit" 
from the guarantee of freedom of religion43, does not mean that it is, itself, 
a beneficiary of such a guarantee in the sense that the Charter guarantees 
that a corporation may exercise the freedom of religion44.) On the other 
hand, freedom of expression including freedom of the press and other 
media of communication have been interpreted to apply to corporate 
beneficiaries, thus indicating that the term employed to designate the 
beneficiaries of s. 2 — "everyone" — does not have a constant meaning. 
For the purposes of guaranteeing certain of the rights contained in s. 2, 
"everyone" is restricted to physical persons ; for others it may extend to 
include bodies corporate. It could be argued, therefore, in the context of 
s. 11, that the case for a constant meaning not being established as a 
matter of principle in Charter interpretation, the exclusion of corporations 
from the protection afforded by s. 11 will have to be grounded on some 
other principle. 
1.3. Mobility rights—Section 6 
Section 6(1) guarantees to every citizen of Canada the right to enter, 
remain in and leave Canada. Section 6(2) guarantees to every citizen of 
41. Id., p. 376. 
42. P.P.G. Industries Canada and Attorney General of Canada, Supra, note 36, p. 108. 
43. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 3. 
44. See discussion below, in re. s. 15. 
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Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of 
Canada the right to move to and take up residence in any province, and to 
pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. 
Case law is scanty on the question of whether the use in s. 6(2) of the 
expression "every person" (toute personne), which normally includes 
legal as well as natural persons, implies that corporations may avail 
themselves of this guarantee. According to the Federal Court (Trial 
Division), the protection provided by section 6(2) is limited to natural 
persons and does not extend to corporations45. 
Most legal commentators are in agreement that section 6 does not 
apply to corporations46. The primary objection to the inclusion of 
corporations within the scope of the protection offered by section 6 
centres on the definition of the terms "citizen" and "permanent 
resident" under federal legislation. The Citizenship Act41 and the 
Immigration Act4S define these terms so as to include only natural 
persons. 
It would be possible of course for the courts to give the terms some 
significance independent of federal statute law. For example, a corpora-
tion could be held to be a Canadian citizen, based on either incorporation 
within Canada or control by Canadian citizens. Moull49 has argued that 
corporations have a "residence" for various purposes—for determining 
income tax liabilities, for example — and that the tests for determining 
corporate residence for income tax purposes import a large degree of 
permanence and may thus accord with the phrase "permanent resident" 
in section 6(2). According to this viewpoint, there is no reason why the 
definition of the term "permanent resident" as used in the Immigration 
Act, where it clearly applies to individuals only, should necessarily 
control the interpretation of a constitutional instrument. 
45. Parkdale Hotel Ltd. v. A.G. of Canada et al., [1986] 2 F.C. 514 (T.D.). 
46. See e.g. P. Blache, "Liberté de circulation" in G.A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, 
Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1989, p. 359; 
P. Bernhardt, "Mobility Rights : Section 6 of the Charter and the Canadian Economic 
Union", (1987) 12 Queen s L.J. 199;P.W. Hogg, supra, note 4, p. 668; C. Jacquier, 
"La liberté de circulation des étudiants au Canada: une liberté garantie et quasi 
absolue", (1985) 16 R.G.D. 511, p. 532; D.A. Schmeiser and K.J. Young, "Mobility 
rights in Canada", (1983) 13 Man. L.J.. 615, p. 627, J.B. Laskin, "Mobility Rights 
Under the Charter", (1982). 4 Supreme Court LR., 89, p. 90-91 ; contra : W.D. Moull, 
"Business Law Implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", 
(1984) 8 Can. Bus. L.J. 449, p. 472. 
47. Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29. 
48. Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. 1-2. 
49. W.D. Moull, supra, note 46. 
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Lee and Trebilcock are of the view that interpretation of the supreme 
law of the land should not be dependent upon the statutory act of a single 
level of government. The court must arrive at a constitutional definition of 
the terms "citizen" and "permanent resident". In so doing, the court 
may rely on various sources of meaning, including international law, and 
corporate law50. 
That the legislator, in framing this Charter provision, doubtless had 
in mind the current statutory definition is, of course, not a deciding factor 
(as is clear from the decision in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act51 where the 
Supreme Court interpreted the expression "principles of fundamental 
justice" in section 7 in a manner which was, on the evidence, clearly 
contrary to the meaning as understood by the legislator at the time of the 
adoption of the Charter). However, the use of the term "citizen" in 
sections 3 and 23 of the Charter—Democratic Rights and Minority 
Language Education Rights—where the restrictive nature of the term is 
clear, lends further support to the argument that the meaning which 
accords with common usage and the current statutory definition is to be 
preferred. Similarly, the use of the expression "permanent resident" in 
close connection with the word "citizen" would imply that the term is to 
be defined here according to normal usage, as referring to the status of an 
individual as defined by one or other of the two acts mentioned above. 
On the other hand, the nature of the rights accorded under s. 6 would 
not seem necessarily to militate against the inclusion of corporations as 
potential beneficiaries. The fact that the rights guaranteed by s. 6(1) 
(which on the plain meaning of the terms appear to relate to the physical 
mobility of natural persons) might not be relevant in the case of a 
corporation would not seem, of itself, to exclude the latter from the ambit 
of protection afforded by section 6(2), the beneficiaries of the two 
guarantees being clearly not identical. The fact that a corporation may not 
be considered to be a "citizen" for the purposes of section 6, and may not 
be the kind of entity that could benefit from the rights conferred by 
subsection (1) does not mean that it may not benefit from the rights 
guaranteed to "permanent residents" under subsection (2). 
Within the context of section 6(2) it has been argued that corpora-
tions are excluded from the scope of the protection guaranteed because 
they are unable to benefit from one of the rights contained therein—the 
"right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province". "Liveli-
hood" could signify, in the corporate context, the carrying on of business, 
50. T. Lee and M.J. Trebilcock, "Economic mobility and constitutional reform", (1987) 37 
U. of T.L.J. 268, p. 284. 
51. Re B.C. Motor Véhicule Act, supra, note 21. 
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and this without putting any greater strain upon the English language than 
is already evident in other areas of Charter interpretation. However, an 
even greater degree of literary licence is probably required in order to 
interpret the French version (gagner leur vie) in this manner. In the face 
of ambiguous terminology, the principe of a broad and liberal approach to 
Charter rights might be applied, should the courts, for social and political 
reasons, favour a wider interpretation which would include corporate 
beneficiaries. 
A judicial interpretation which would deny the protection of s. 6(2)(b) 
to corporate beneficiaries would not necessarily exclude corporations 
from the benefits provided by other guaranties under this section. Should 
the position of the now Chief Justice prevail in the context of s. 11, 
rejecting the "all-or-nothing" approach, and thereby permitting a 
beneficiary to enjoy certain rights guaranteed by a provision, even though 
others contained in the same section may be unavailable to him, this 
principle of "selective benefit" could militate in favour of corporations in 
the context also of section 6(2). According to this approach, even if it 
were decided that the right contained in subsection 6(2)(b) — the gaining 
of a livelihood — could not be enjoyed by a corporate body, the right 
guaranteed in subsection (a) might still be available to corporations. 
Finally, as Professor Hogg points out52, such an extension of mobility 
rights to include corporations would represent a radical change in 
Canada's constitutional law, which has hitherto always denied full legal 
status to a corporation outside its jurisdiction of incorporation. 
1.4. Equality rights — Section 15 
Despite the ambiguous wording of s. 15 which, depending upon the 
choice of interpretative rule, could be understood to include corporations 
within the ambit of its protection, other factors taken together lead to a 
more restrictive interpretation of the scope of the guarantee. The 
legislative history of the provision, the objectives which the guarantee is 
designed to achieve, as evidenced by the indicia of discrimination 
established in R. v. Andrews53, all point to the exclusion of corporations 
as direct beneficiaries of the guarantees provided by s. 15. 
Such a conclusion as to the identity of the immediate beneficiaries, 
even if confirmed by the Supreme Court, would not provide an answer to 
the question of who may benefit "indirectly" from the protection 
afforded to natural persons. Decisions to date which have permitted 
52. P.W. Hogg, supra, note 4. 
53. R. v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
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corporations to benefit indirectly from the s. 15 guarantee, in accordance 
with the rationale of Big M., have made the granting of such protection 
conditional upon the existence of criminal or penal proceedings. 
However, recent decisions by the Supreme Court would seem to suggest 
that the outcome of the debate will not turn on this single criterion. The 
issue would appear to involve some fundamental considerations con-
cerning the matter of standing and the general effects of a declaration of 
constitutional invalidity. 
1.4.1. Terminology 
The beneficiaries of s. 15 are designated by the terms "individual" in 
the English version and personne and tous in the French version. The 
term personne can refer to either a natural person or a corporate body and 
tous is equally indefinite. Although the term "individual" has been used 
by Dickson J. to mean either real persons or artificial ones such as 
corporations54, it is normally understood to exclude the latter55. 
An attempt to harmonize the French and English texts by finding a 
"common meaning" would suggest that the French text be "read down" 
so as to confine it to natural persons. However, the search for a common 
meaning, as an interpretative aid, is to be employed with caution. 
According to Beaupré, "even though as an initial step in the interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous provision, a construction is found that is common to 
both the English and French versions, that construction must be related 
back to and tested against the entire context of the provision before being 
settled upon."56. 
In the context of the Charter, the principle of a broad and liberal 
construction must be taken into consideration. According to this rule, the 
expression of the rights and freedoms enumerated must receive a 
generous interpretation aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee57. 
A broad and liberal construction of the language used in s. 15 could favour 
the wider meaning permitted by the phrasing of the French version, thus 
calling for the inclusion of corporations within the ambit of the protection 
afforded by this provision. But would such a generous interpretation fulfil 
the purpose of the guarantee ? 
54. R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, supra, note 3, p. 313. 
55. See e.g. P.W. Hogg, supra, note 4, p. 667. 
56. R.M. Beaupré, Construing Bilingual Legislation in Canada, Toronto, Butterworths, 
1981, p. 125. 
57. R.M. Beaupré, Interpreting Bilingual Legislation, 2d ed., Toronto, Carwsell, 1986, 
p. 202 ; H. Brun, "Quelques notes sur les articles 1, 2, 7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne 
des droits et libertés", (1982) 23 C. de D. 781, p. 793 ; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 
supra, note 3, p. 344; Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 22, p. 156-7. 
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1.4.2. Legislative history and original intent 
In examining the "entire context of the provision" one must look not 
only at the language employed but also at the general purpose of the 
guarantee. According to the documented legislative history of the 
section58, the term "every individual" was substituted for the word 
"everyone" in order to make it clear that the right would apply to natural 
persons only. However, such legislative history in general, as an indicator 
of intent, is to be given "minimal weight" in the view of the Supreme 
Court59. The reliability of the historical evidence as to parliamentary 
intent in the case of s. 15 is further called into question by the ambiguous 
nature of the French version of the provision. Although it must have been 
apparent to any legal draftsman or legislator from Quebec that the term 
personne could be given a wider meaning, the necessary change was not 
made in the French version in order to make the restricted meaning clear. 
Finally, even in circumstances where the original intent of the 
legislator appears to be well established, it is clear from the decision in Re 
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act60 that such evidence is not determinative of the 
present scope of a constitutional guarantee. 
1.4.3. The purpose of the s. 15 guarantee : the immediate beneficiaries 
Except where a corporation invokes section 15(1) as a defence to 
criminal or penal liability, decisions to date in the lower courts limit the 
scope of this guarantee to the protection of human beings61. Justification 
for this restriction is founded not only upon the wording of s. 15(1), but 
also upon the enumerated heads of discrimination. The Supreme Court 
has not yet had occasion to consider in principle the matter of the standing 
of a corporation to invoke s. 1562. 
According to the Court of Appeal of British Columbia63, a corpora-
tion does not qualify for the protection of section 15(1) not only because it 
58. Consolidation of Proposed Resolution and Possible Amendments as Placed before the 
Special Joint Committee by the Minister of Justice, Jan. 1981, p. 7, together with 
explanatory notes. 
59. Re B.C. Motor Véhicule Act, supra, note 21, p. 509. 
60. Id. 
61. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. A.G. Canada, [1986] 1 F.C. 274, conf. at 
[1987] 2 F.C. 359 (C.A.);fi . v. Paul Madger Furs, L.W. 12.5.89 (C.A. Ont.); Milk 
Board v. Clearview Dairy Farm Inc., [1987] 3 W.W.R. 279 (B.C.C.A.); Garderie 
Blanche-Neige Inc. c. Office des services de garde à l'enfance, (1987) D.L.Q. 17 
(CS.) ; Association des détaillants en alimentation du Québec c. Ferme Carnaval Inc., 
(1986)R.J.Q. 2513 (CS.) . 
62. Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990], 1 S.CR. 695, p. 703. 
63. Milk Board v. Clearview Dairy Farm Inc., supra, note 61. 
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is not an individual, but also because it has no race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability or any other 
comparable quality. However, as is now established by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia64, the 
grounds of discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) are not exhaustive. The 
section aims to protect against the enumerated and also against analagous 
grounds65. Both the enumerated grounds themselves and other possible 
grounds of discrimination must be interpreted in a broad and generous 
manner, reflecting the fact that they are constitutional provisions66. 
Citizenship was found by the Supreme Court in this same decision to be 
one such analagous ground. 
The point has been made that "citizenship" and "residence" (which 
might arguably constitute another analagous ground) form a common 
basis of "discrimination" in a variety of pieces of corporate and 
regulatory legislation, and that corporations might thereby be granted 
access to the benefits of s. 1567. However, a determination as to whether 
the claimant belongs to an analogous category to those enumerated in 
s. 15 is to be made in the context of the place of the group in the entire 
social, political and legal fabric of our society68. Such an examination 
must determine if the group which is discriminated against by law 
constitutes a "discrete and insular minority" or displays indicia of 
discrimination such as stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vul-
nerability to political and social prejudice69. It is unlikely that a 
corporation, even if admitted to the category of "individual", would be 
able to show that it belonged to any such grouping70. 
1.4.4. Indirect beneficiaries 
Although section 15(1) is not considered to include corporations as 
immediate beneficiaries, case law to date, in the lower courts, holds that a 
corporation may nevertheless invoke this guarantee in order to contest 
the constitutional validity of a law under which it is charged71. 
64. R. v. Andrews, supra, note 53, p. 175. 
65. Id., p. 182. 
66. Id., p. 175. 
67. W.D. Moull, supra, note 46, p. 482-3. 
68. R. v. Andrews, supra, note 53, p. 152. 
69. R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1296, p. 1333. 
70. Wolff & Co. v. Canada, supra, note 62, p. 700. 
71. Cabre Exploration Ltd. v. Arndt, (1986) 22 C.R.R. 319 (CA. Alta) ; Energy Probe and 
A.G. Can., (1988) 61 O.R. (2d) 65 (H.C.), rev. for other reasons at (1989) 58 D.L.R. 
(4th) 513 (Ont. CA. ) . 
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The decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. would seem to suggest, 
by necessary implication, that there exist two kinds of beneficiaries of 
Charter guarantees. There is the immediate beneficiary (human or 
otherwise, depending upon the right involved) who may apply to a court, 
under section 24(1), for enforcement of rights and freedoms which are 
guaranteed directly to him by the Charter. For example, in the 
circumstances of Big M a non-Christian individual obliged to "observe" 
the Christian sabbath and therefore unable for practical, economic 
reasons to observe his own sabbath would be the direct beneficiary of the 
freedom of religion guaranteed by s. 2(a). The corporation was the 
indirect beneficiary, benefiting in this case not from the guarantee of 
freedom of religion which it was obviously incapable of exercising, but 
from the effect produced upon the legislative provision in question by its 
infringement of this freedom as guaranteed to an individual. A law which 
itself infringes religious freedom is, by that reason alone, inconsistent 
with s. 2(a) of the Charter and it matters not whether the accused is an 
individual or a corporation. It is the nature of the law, not the status of the 
accused that is in issue73. 
Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a criminal 
charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is brought is 
constitutionally invalid. In Big M the corporation argued successfully that 
the law under which it had been charged was inconsistent with s. 2(a) of 
the Charter and by reason of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it was of 
no force or effect. Whether a corporation could enjoy or exercise freedom 
of religion was therefore irrelevant74. 
The rationale of the Supreme Court in Big M should apply in 
principle to any guarantee which is not directly available to a corporate 
litigant. As noted above, the argument has been used successfully in the 
context of s. 15 in cases where a corporation has relied upon the 
unconstitutionnality of a legislative provision to defend itself against a 
criminal or penal charge. However, the soundness of this argument in the 
context of s. 15 is yet to be tested by the Supreme Court. 
In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.)75 La Forest, L'Heureux-
Dubé and Sopinka J.J., who were dissident in part, opined that section 15 
did not apply to corporations. However, in the view of the majority of the 
Court, consideration of the applicability of s. 15 was not necessary in the 
72. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 3. 
73. Id., p. 314. 
74. Id. 
75. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.) [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. 
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circumstances. Similarly, in the case of Wolff & Co. v. Canada76, the 
Supreme Court found it "neither necessary nor advisable" to deal with 
the question of whether a corporation has standing to invoke section 15. 
In deferring consideration of this matter, the Court could be leaving open 
not only the question of whether a corporation may benefit indirectly 
from the guarantee of s. 15, but also the fundamental question of whether 
a corporation has standing to invoke s. 15 as a "direct" beneficiary. 
However, for the reasons discussed above and in light of the obiter 
comment in Wolff to the effect that the Crown is not a physical person 
with whom a comparison may be made77, it seems likely that physical 
persons alone will be accorded the direct benefit of the guarantee and that 
future consideration of the potential standing of a corporation will focus 
on the question of its ability to raise, as an "indirect" beneficiary, the 
invalidity of a legislation provision as it effects a human being. 
In allowing the appeal in Zutphen Bros.1*, the Supreme Court found 
that the impugned provisions did not constitute discrimination for the 
reason, as expressed in Wolff9, that the legislation did not discriminate on 
enumerated or analogous grounds. The Court expressly left for future 
consideration the issue of whether a corporation has standing to invoke 
s. 15. In this same decision80 but in the context of the denial of standing to 
a corporation to invoke s. 7, the Court did comment on the principle 
established by Big M, finding it not applicable because no penal 
proceedings were pending. The fact that it was unwilling to dispose in like 
manner of the issue of corporate standing under s. 15 would suggest that, 
in the context of this latter provision, the criterion of the presence or 
absence of penal proceedings might not suffice in the determination of the 
applicability of the Big M principle and of the standing of a corporation to 
rely upon the invalidity of a law violating the equality rights of an 
individual. In other words, even in circumstances where the criminal/ 
penal condition is met, a corporation may yet be unable, in the case of 
s. 15, to rely upon the unconstitutional nature of a law vis-à-vis an 
individual. A corporation wishing to invoke s. 15 in its defence, may have 
to meet additional requirements in order to be granted standing. 
76. Wolff & Co. v. Canada, supra, note 62, p. 703. 
77. Id., p. 700. 
78. Zutphen Bros. Construction Ltd. v. Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd., 
supra, note 20. 
79. Wolff & Co. v. Canada, supra, note 62, p. 703. 
80. Zutphen Bros. Construction Ltd. v. Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd., 
supra, note 20, p. 709. 
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1.4.5. Further considerations 
Certain elements and implications of the Big M decision call for 
clarification by the courts. 
The result in Big M and the principle which it establishes raise certain 
issues concerning the effects of a declaration of invalidity and the related 
matter of standing to raise constitutional questions under the Charter. A 
discussion of such fundamental matters is beyond the scope of this 
paper81, but it is perhaps useful to point to certain elements of the decision 
in Big M where judicial elaboration could be particularly helpful in the 
context of corporations and the s. 15 guarantee. 
We are dealing with a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada and 
therefore, through the operation of the rule of authoritative precedent, the 
effects of the declaration of invalidity are far wider than those resulting 
from the simple authority of res judicata among the parties to the dispute. 
This does not imply, however, that such a declaration has authority erga 
omnes, although the phrasing of the decision in Big M might seem to 
suggest the latter interpretation. To say that "it is the nature of the law, 
not the status of the accused, that is in issue"82 might suggest that, in the 
context of Charter rights, if a law is invalid, it is invalid for all purposes 
and for all parties. 
But if the "nature" of the law remains constant, as appears to be the 
inference, then not only the "status" of the accused but also the judicial 
circumstances of the accused and indeed the circumstances of any party 
to the dispute must be irrelevant to the question of the applicability ofthat 
law. Once a legislative provision has been found to be unconstitutional it 
could be argued, given the apparent rationale of Big M, that it is 
unconstitutional erga omnes and that a corporate applicant should not be 
denied the right to rely upon a previous finding of unconstitutionality, 
regardless of whether the dispute involves an issue of criminal/penal 
liability. 
Yet the fact that conditions are now clearly being imposed upon the 
ability of a corporate litigant to raise the matter of the invalidity of a law 
as it affects a natural person83 would seem to imply, on the contrary, that 
such invalidity is not necessarily absolute. To assume otherwise could 
lead to the unfortunate inference that the courts, in restricting the 
81. See for example, P.W. Hogg, supra, note 4, p. 344 f ; B.L. Strayer, The Canadian 
Constitution and the Courts: the function and scope of judicial review; 3d ed., 
Toronto, Butterworths, 1988; S. Létoumeau, "L'autorité d'un jugement prononçant 
l'inconstitutionnalité d'une loi", (1989) 23 R.J.T. 173. 
82. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 3, p. 314. 
83. See supra, note 79. 
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standing of parties to invoke such invalidity, were in effect imposing 
certain conditions upon the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution 
itself. 
If one assumes that there is no implication in Big M of absolute 
invalidity and that the "nature of the law" in issue was in fact varying as 
to its invalidity, then the possibility that a statute could infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of some people and yet remain valid against others is 
not ruled out. (It has been argued84 that the wording of s. 52(1) of the 
Constitution Act 1982 — "to the extent of the inconsistency" — allows for 
this interpretation.) The issue then becomes one of standing to invoke the 
invalidity of a provision as it applies to an individual. The standing of a 
corporation to invoke such relative invalidity has been established with 
regard to s. 2(a)85 and, by necessary implication, with regard to s. 786. 
The question of the standing of a corporation to invoke s. 15(1) and 
the unconstitutional nature of a law which infringes upon the equality 
rights of an individual can be viewed from two different perspectives. 
First of all, there is the question of whether a corporation is to be granted 
standing to present evidence in an attempt to "convince" the court of the 
unconstitutional nature of a law vis-à-vis an individual. Secondly, there is 
the question of when a corporation may "rely upon" a finding of 
invalidity which has already been made, pursuant to an application by an 
individual who does have standing to invoke s. 15(1). This latter question 
raises again the issue of the scope of a declaration of invalidity under the 
Charter. 
If we are to assume, as seems likely, that in the case of s. 15(1) the 
criminal/penal proceedings criterion will not suffice, what additional 
criteria might apply to a decision on the standing of a corporation to 
present evidence with regard to the alleged infringement of the rights of an 
individual ? In the context of freedom of religion, the approach adopted 
by the Supreme Court of the United States has been proposed as a model. 
Thus a litigant charged with a breach of a statute would have to argue that 
the duty imposed on him by the statute would prevent either him, "or a 
citizen with whom he had a special connection", from asserting his or 
their rights87. According to this approach, although a corporation itself 
does not have the right to freedom of religion, it should have the standing 
84. See W. Rozéfort, "Are Corporations Entitled to Freedom of Religion under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?", (1986) 15 Man L.J. 199, p. 216-218. 
85. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 3. 
86. Zutphen Bros. Construction Ltd. v. Dywidag Systems International Canada Ltd., 
supra, note 20. 
87. W. Rozéfort, supra, note 84, p. 217. 
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to assert the rights of its officers or employees to such freedom. The 
corporation that has no employees or officers having to observe a day 
other than a Sunday, would have no standing to challenge the validity of a 
Sunday observance statute. Such a selective approach might be adopted 
with regard to the standing of a corporation to challenge the validity of 
legislation under s. 15(1). 
The Supreme Court may eventually rule that a corporation may only 
be granted standing to challenge legislation, as it affects the equality rights 
of an individual, in the circumstances of a defence against criminal or 
penal charges with or without additional preconditions, or in circumstan-
ces where the corporation is engaged in "public interest litigation" and 
has fulfilled the status requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in 
the trilogy of "standing" cases88. If this is indeed the decision with regard 
to s. 15(1), then it is to be expected that, short of a clear statement on the 
part of the Supreme Court with regard to the limited scope of a 
declaration of invalidity, prospective corporate litigants will resort more 
and more to the device of "pre-determining" the law by funding test cases 
designed to meet their future evidentiary requirements. Where the 
circumstances of a case do not permit the joining of an individual 
plaintiff89 whose circumstances allow for a decision on the constitutional 
issue under s. 15(1), corporate interests may yet set the constitutional 
stage by funding individuals in their private litigation or, where the issue 
is of a stricly commercial nature, by establishing sole proprietorships for 
the purpose of establishing the invalidity of a law which they themselves 
are unable to challenge directly. 
Thus by restricting access to s. 15(1) guarantees in the case of 
corporations, we can expect to see an increase in the demands upon court 
time required to deal with cases which have been artificially scinded, and 
in which issues of vital social concern are dealt with in an inadequate 
fashion because the real players are disguised behind the masks of human 
litigants. 
1.5. Economic rights 
The question arises as to whether the Charter protects economic 
rights as such, as distinct from the indirect protection of economic 
interests which results from the granting to corporations of the protection 
88. Thorson v. A.G. of Canada, [19751 1 S.C.R. 138; Nova Scotia Board of Censors 
v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 
2 S.C.R. 575. 
89. E.g. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. A.G. Canada, supra, note 61 ; 
Parkdale Hotel Ltd. v. A..G. Canada, (1986) 2 F.C. 514. 
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of rights such as the freedom of (commercial) expression. To what extent 
does the constitutional protection of economic rights, if it exists, redound 
to the favour of corporations ? 
The question of whether the Charter is in any way concerned with 
economic rights was addressed in Re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act90 and the answer appeared to be clearly negative — in the context of 
the debate over the right to strike. Thus Mclntyre J. observes that, "with 
the possible exception of s. 6(2)b) (the right to earn a livelihood in any 
province) and par. 6(4) (affirmative action programs) the Charter does not 
concern itself with economic rights"91. 
In Black v. Law Society of Alberta, the Alberta Court of Appeal, in a 
judgment confirmed by the Supreme Court found that s. 2(d) protects the 
formation of an association for the earning of a living. The Supreme 
Court, in confirming this decision, noted that economic concerns 
undoubtedly played a part in the constitutional entrenchment of inter-
provincial mobility rights, under s. 6(2) of the Charter92. 
In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.)93, the Supreme Court expressly 
did not rule out the possibility that rights with economic components 
might fall within the ambit of "security of the person" in section 7. 
However, the Court concluded that a corporation could not avail itself of 
the protection offered by s. 794. 
2. Corporations and constitutional choices 
2.1. Clarification and reconsideration of objectives 
The present state of Canadian jurisprudence concerning the objec-
tives of the Charter as reflected in the identification of its beneficiaries, 
can satisfy neither those who view a Charter of Rights as a shield 
primarily designed to protect the rights and freedoms of human beings, 
nor the advocates of adequate constitutional protection for corporate 
interests. On the one hand, through the extension of rights to corpora-
tions, the scope of these constitutional guarantees goes way beyond what 
was originally considered to be the field of operation of a Charter of 
"Human" Rights. On the other hand, if one accepts the rationale for the 
extension of such guarantees to legal persons, then it is hard to find a 
90. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra, note 16. 
91. Id., p. 412. 
92. Black v. Law Society of Alberta, supra, note 18, p. 612. 
93. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.), supra, note 11, p. 1003. 
94. Id., p. 1002. 
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logical and philosophical justification for the many chinks in the panoply 
of corporate constitutional armour. 
In the absence of political direction, judges are left to wrestle with the 
inconsistencies arising out of the interpretation of ambiguous terminology 
concerning Charter beneficiaries. In the context of the Canadian Charter, 
it seems that they must continue to shoulder the burden of responsability 
for what should be clearly recognized as political decisions with far-
reaching social and economic consequences. In Quebec, however, the 
opportunity for clarification and reconsideration of the objectives of 
Charter guarantees could soon be afforded in the overall context of 
constitutional review. 
In the present climate of consititutional uncertainty which may well 
give rise in Quebec to a reconsideration of, among other things, the status 
of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, it is perhaps not too early 
to begin some re-thinking about the primary purposes of this document 
which, depending upon the outcome of the major constitutional debate, 
might no longer be subject to interpretative rules derived from Canadian 
Charter decisions95. 
Corporate beneficiaries may be well suited with the evolutionary drift 
of the Canadian Charter and, in its tow, of Quebec Charter jurisprudence. 
However, if they wish to preserve their current status, arguments must be 
prepared in advance of constitutional review, in order to meet the very 
significant case which can be made against an automatic acceptance of the 
status quo with regard to the beneficiaries of constitutional guarantees96. 
2.2. Constitutionally guaranteed human rights — the case 
against corporate beneficiaries 
The proper approach to the interpretation of Charter guarantees is, 
according to the Supreme Court, the "purposive approach"97. If such 
guarantees are to be available to legal and natural persons alike, the 
identification of the purpose of a particular provision becomes extremely 
difficult, since the guarantee will serve different purposes for these 
different categories of beneficiaries. For example, as Professor Petter 
points out98, in the case of the individual, the section 8 right to be free 
95. For example, cerUiin instances of judicial "transplants" such as the transfer from the 
Canadian Charter of the s. 1 Oakes tests for use in the application of s. 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter may warrant closer scrutiny. 
96. See for example, A. Petter, "The Politics of the Charter", (1986) 8 Supreme Court 
L.R. 473, p. 490 f. 
97. Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 22, p. 156. 
98. A. Petter, supra, note 96, p. 490-91. 
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from unreasonable search or seizure is a privacy right rather than a 
property right. While the privacy interests of human beings relate to their 
needs for psychological and bodily security, in addition to economic 
security, the privacy interests of corporations do not. To grant a 
corporation a privacy right is to grant it a property right pure and simple. 
Thus the search for the purpose of a guarantee becomes extremely 
difficult if the right in question is seen to serve the widely differing 
interests of both corporate and human beneficiaries. 
Among the more telling arguments against the protection of cor-
porate interests by means of a charter of human rights is one which can be 
derived from the reasoning of Mr. Justice Mclntyre in Re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act : the overwhelming preoccupation of the Charter 
is with individual, political and democratic rights with conspicuous 
inattention to economic and property rights". Any rights sought by a 
corporation are required for the purpose of enabling it the more 
successfully to fulfill the purpose for which it was established, which is 
essentially an economic purpose. To this extent, rights and freedoms 
guaranteed to corporations are in essence property and economic rights. 
The other concern addressed by Mclntyre J.100 involves the nature of 
decisional processes in areas which are crucial to the maintenance of the 
balance between major and competing sectors or interest groups in our 
society. In the context of labour law, this concern was used as a criterion 
for deciding whether a court of law was the appropriate forum for 
deciding a major social issue. 
Extensive statutory provisions already in place in the area of 
corporate law might suggest, as in the labour-law field, that we are dealing 
with a matter that is crucial to the continuing smooth working of our 
social institutions and that it is therefore an area best left to the judgement 
of democratically elected members of the parliament and legislatures, 
with all the technical and research tools at their disposal, and with all their 
variety and depth of knowledge and experience. 
Finally, the purpose of a Charter of Rights is not to protect or 
guarantee a particular right or freedom as an abstract value but to ensure 
that power relationships in our society do not become "unbalanced" to 
the point where the liberty of the individual is restricted to a greater 
extent than democratic society generally considers to be reasonable and 
justifiable. If this is indeed the raison d'être of a document such as the 
Charter, what justification can we offer for extending such protection to 
99. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra, note 16, p. 413. 
100. Id., p. 412-418. 
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those institutions in our society which as a general rule do not suffer from 
the imbalance which affects the relationship between the individual and 
the state ? 
2.3. The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 
It is not evident from the wording of the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms that corporations should necessarily benefit from 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein, to the extent and in a manner 
comparable to that established by Canadian Charter decisions101. Despite 
an apparent emphasis on the rights of human beings, however, it became 
clear from the beginning that the guarantees provided by the Quebec 
Charter would not be restricted to natural persons102. With the advent of 
the Canadian Charter, the debate on this issue shifted to another forum. 
It is clear that in the present constitutional context there would be 
little practical point in interpreting the Quebec Charter in a more 
restrictive manner than the Canadian Charter, since the latter would 
prevail anyway. In the case of Ford v. Quebec (A.G.)]03, for example, not 
only was the guarantee of freedom of expression of s. 3 of the Quebec 
Charter interpreted in the same manner as the guarantee contained in s. 2 
of the Canadian Charter, so as to protect commercial expression but, 
more significantly yet, the criteria to be applied in the assessment of the 
justification of "limits" to guaranteed rights under the former document 
were, in the view of the Supreme Court, identical to those employed in 
Canadian Charter decisions. Thus, despite the wording of s. 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter which might suggest a primary concern for human and 
communal values not evident in the equivalent provision (s. 1) of the 
Canadian Charter, limits imposed on freedom of expression and on other 
rights and freedoms are to be judged under the two documents by 
identical criteria. As a result, any possibility that limits on corporate 
rights under the Quebec Charter might prove for practical purposes, 
101. The wording of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, might, on the 
contrary, have led one to expect an exclusive concern for the protection of human 
beings. Although the French title contains the indefinite term personne, the English 
version is unambiguous in its reference to "human" rights and freedoms. The word 
personne is employed in one paragraph of the Preamble, the other four considérant 
clauses thereof containing the expressions être humain, or personne humaine. Again, 
in the English version there would appear to be no misunderstanding. The expressions 
are throughout "human being", "human person", "human rights". 
102. See H. Brun, "La Charte des droits et libertés de la personne: domaine d'applica-
tion", (1977) 37 R. du B. 179. p. 187. 
103. Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), supra, note 8. 
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through the use of different justificatory criteria, to be of a different order 
from those permitted by the Canadian Charter now seems to be ruled out. 
Conclusion 
Opportunity for the clarification and/or reconsideration of objectives, 
as reflected in the identification of the beneficiaries of Charter guarantees, 
may yet be afforded in Quebec through the medium of general 
constitutional review. If, at such time, a decision were reached that 
corporations should indeed benefit from the protection offered by a 
constitutionally enshrined Quebec Charter, this intent ought to be made 
clear in the wording of the appropriate guarantees. Corporate rights 
should not be left to emerge piecemeal from judicial interpretation. 
If, on the contrary, constitutional protection for corporations were 
thought to be unnecessary or, alternatively, not appropriately provided 
through guarantees framed to protect human beings, then thought would 
have to be given to the question of whether corporations, or indeed any 
other would-be beneficiaries not covered directly by the Charter, should 
be able to use the Quebec equivalent of s. 52(1) (which would presumably 
be required in a constitutionally enshrined document) in order to benefit 
"indirectly" from the rights guaranteed to individuals. 
There are ways of protecting corporate and other non-human rights 
without expecting a Charter of Rights and Freedoms to become the 
constitutional factotum, able to right all the wrongs of our society. Many 
would suggest that the damage being done to the environment and the 
need for protective guarantees in this area require immediate attention. 
We may indeed have to consider the constitutional entrenchment of 
certain principles of environmental protection. But surely such guaran-
tees would not be included in a Charter of (human) Rights ? To give trees 
rights under a Charter and to try to decide upon appropriate measures for 
their protection in terms of human values could only confuse the issues 
and render logical, rational solutions — for humans or trees — impossible 
to achieve. Fortunately, however, the distinction between a human being 
and a tree is easy to grasp. Not so the distinction between people and 
corporations. As a result of a legal fiction (useful in the context of 
corporation law) the distinction between a natural person and a legal 
person has been blurred, with the result that the needs of human beings 
are confused with those of corporate entities — which in many cases are 
themselves as responsible as governments for the limitations imposed 
upon human rights and freedoms. 
If we are to devise effective constitutional solutions to the fundamen-
tal problems of our society, we must start from the simple premise that 
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human beings, corporations and trees (which may all require, to varying 
degrees, protection of their "rights") face problems which are fundamen-
tally different in nature, the solutions to which call for the consideration 
of vastly different principles and values — which are not to be found in a 
single constitutional "grab-bag" of rights and freedoms. 
